Russian Drang nach Westen

The pragmatic belief of the West that the persistence on the stability of Western Balkans can be achieved at the cost of neglecting democratic reforms, proved to be shortsighted, as, in a relatively short period of time, all the chronic hot spots in the region activated at once.

While the amount of nationalism per capita dangerously magnified, reviving the conflicting rhetoric that, at certain point reminded of the wars in the 1990s, Western strategists were pleased that the open conflict was finally avoided and that the regional leaders, in charge of maintaining stability, were kept under control.

However, the growth of nationalism was only a symptom. Following the old ways and tested recipes, when it was necessary to homogenize the citizens though "patriotism", politicians resorted to nationalism as to a compensational business, mostly in order to distract people from the failed reforms, stunted institutions, weak rule of law, corruption, particracy, rejection of criticism or control over media. The ambiance of unfinished states stimulated the authoritarian ambitions.

Therefore, while the region seemed stable, the West was comfortable with the status quo. Then things took a turn for worse. In the last three years, relations between Serbia and Croatia, crucial for the region’s stability, often reached the lowest points since the war. Tensions increased in Montenegro and then in Macedonia. Bosnia and Herzegovina have languished as an example of a dysfunctional state, accompanied with the threats of the Serbian Republic secession.

The Brussels bureaucrats perceived the dialogue between Belgrade and Pristina as a chance to one day share the Nobel Peace Prize, but the normalization of relations has had a slow progress. This process, which is of fateful importance for both negotiators’ path to the EU, is too often used for the firing up of local-patriotism, which is again a direct obstacle to finding mutually acceptable solutions.

The West has recently woken up. Not because of the democratic deficit. Increased engagement of the European Union and NATO came only after the Brussels alarms detected a strong penetration of Russian influence in the Western Balkans. The events of the last three years confirmed Russia’s efficiency and the strength of their "destabilization capacities".

Since the outbreak of the crisis in Ukraine, Moscow has set Western Balkans on the map of its strategic interests by sending a message to the West: if you continue with the approach of NATO to our borders, we will show you that we can destabilize other regions as well. Taking into account its explosive potentials, Balkan has proven to be a suitable polygon for this.

In the meantime, European Union was shaken by a series of crises and the European allies of the United States constantly questioned NATO’s purpose. Moscow has recognized the attractive opportunities. Political pragmatics and PR consultants in the Kremlin realized that the weakness of the West is an opportunity for Russia to try out its sophisticated methods of "soft power" in practice, but also to demonstrate that it will not hesitate to apply double standards in pragmatic politics.

In Podgorica, the Kremlin was on the side of the anti-NATO "street" which was in opposition to the Montenegrin accession to NATO, while in Skopje it was against the pro-democratic "street" which demanded the capitulation of the Macedonian government, increasingly tied to the Russians.

Serbian Republic was transformed into a Russian subsidiary, Russophiles roam Montenegro and Macedonia, the Kremlin is establishing non-governmental organizations in northern Kosovo, Serbia is openly given an option to forget the EU and turn to the East. The key motive of the Russian Drang nach Westen is the intent to stop NATO enlargement in the Western Balkans. Now, as Montenegro "slipped", targets are Bosnia and Herzegovina, through the Serbian Republic, and Serbia, which is being threatened that the possible entry into the Western military alliance would be a “catastrophe”.

Relying on “panslovenism”, "the superiority of the Orthodox civilization", economic and military ties from the time of Yugoslavia and historical myths, Moscow has spread its anti-NATO campaign towards the EU. Through the clerical-nationalist right, which has its representatives in the Serbian parliament, the message is sent that EU is no longer a guarantee of good life and stability, while terrorism is used as an argument that it is no longer even safe. Various political parties, groups, NGOs, the Serbian Orthodox Church, associates of certain scientific institutes, portals and media professionals openly push for the Russian thesis that Serbia has an alternative to the EU - the Eurasian Federation.

For the three-year balance of its engagement in the Western Balkans, Russia can be proud of its success. Can the West say the same after having an absolute supremacy in Serbia after 2000? What activated the alarms about increased Russian presence all of a sudden?

After 2000, Serbia defined its strategic orientation towards Euro-Atlantic integration. The idea of joining NATO did not provoke as much expected resistance at a time when the wounds of the 1999 bombing were fresh. How did the Atlantic Integration component lose sway in coming years, and why does the idea of NATO membership now have significantly fewer supporters than 17 years ago?

There is only one answer to this question: proven pro-Western politicians have begun - for the sake of power - compromising with the nationalists. Thus, the open space was created for the growing influence of conservative, clerical powers that see the future of Serbia in the east, in strong ties with Russia.

You reap what you sow, goes the Serbian proverb. NATO as an idea is pushed to the margins of political thought. The European Union overwhelmed with its crises, Brexit and Donald Trump looks like a remote dream. Russia's influence in the public’s perspective was motivated by the Putin's authoritarian model of rule from Serbia to Macedonia to Montenegro and Kosovo.

West has ignored the warnings that the deficit of democracy allows for destabilization to occur. Its failure to demand from the Balkan leaders a strong respect of democratic standards opened the door to anti-European, pro-Russian forces that promote values of the societies in which people serve the state, not vice versa.

EU, US, and NATO are now determined to effectively control the Balkan processes since they realized, a little too late, that the destabilization of the region puts Russia in control. If Serbia distances itself from NATO irreversibly, even from the EU, Russia will dominate Western Balkans. Fortunately, by promoting the doctrine of military neutrality and insisting that the West is the first and only strategic orientation of Serbia, the current leaders in Belgrade will not allow us to wake up in a future world in which Serbia is part of Eastern Orthodoxy instead of the democratic West.

Reinforced persistence with the Western Balkan states not to play with nationalism but to start with genuine reforms and building of institutions, might as well be a collateral gain of the obvious concerns of the West over Russia's penetration into the region.

A stronger and more concrete confirmation of its commitment to the Western Balkans is expected of the Western allies. Before Moscow does so. A prerequisite is that the West recognizes that there is no stability without democracy, as there is no democracy without stability.